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Introduction1
“East Asia’s recent past is littered with examples of conscience shocking inhumanity against
civilian populations,” writes Alexander Bellamy. 2 “Indeed, for much of the Cold War, people in
East Asia were arguably at greater risk of death by genocide and mass atrocities than anyone else
in the world,” Bellamy observes.3 He continues:
Almost unnoticed, however, the region has been transformed. There are fewer cases of
genocide and mass atrocities in East Asia today than at any point in history for which
we have reliable records. This change has coincided with, and been informed by, a quiet
revolution in the region’s understanding of the rights and responsibilities of sovereignty.4

This “quiet revolution” is due in part to an unfolding commitment to what Steven Pinker has called
the global human rights revolution, which broke out in the wake of World War II and spread to the
countries in East Asia.5
Pinker has assembled in his book, The Better Angels of Our Nature, compelling “big data,”
drawn from a host of sources, that since 1945 the world community has experienced a significant
reduction in the number of genocides and mass atrocities.6 While it is a controversial thesis that
seems to be defied by current events, including President Bashar al-Assad’s barrel bombing of
Syrian civilians and the rise of ISIS, Pinker has effectively answered his critics and has updated his
argument.7 In comparative terms, “the world’s civilians are several thousand times less likely to be
targeted today than they were 70 years ago,” argue Pinker and Mack.8 The development of norms
by the global community that are then adopted by regional organizations like the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)9 help explain the success of the post-World War II human
rights revolution.
The global community created the UN (1945), held 13 trials holding the Nazis responsible
for crimes against humanity (1947-1948), and endorsed the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), and more recently, the Responsibility to Protect
doctrine (2005). The doctrine, based on three pillars, makes it a responsibility for the member states
of the United Nations to prevent genocide and mass atrocities that may result from interstate and
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intrastate conflict.10 Luck and Luck correctly argue that R2P has been a success; it has been called
one of the fastest-developing international norms in history.11 Beginning in 2005, the norms of
R2P have inspired international activism, have been invoked in twenty-five UN Security Council
resolutions, have been used to justify successful efforts to prevent or mitigate atrocity violence in
Africa (Kenya, 2008; Burundi, 2008; Cote d’Ivoire, 2010; Libya, 2011), and have contributed to the
reduction of mass atrocities in East Asia.
I suggest that the reduction of mass atrocity crimes in East Asia can be attributed to the
global human rights revolution and ASEAN genocide and mass atrocities prevention norms
and mechanisms that work to assimilate the global values of R2P with those of ASEAN member
states. The “ASEAN way” serves as a positive model for other regional organizations.12 To be sure,
the recent mass atrocities committed against the Rohingya civilians in Myanmar, a member of
ASEAN, illustrate that the creation of shared human rights norms may be a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for the prevention of human rights abuses. However, the horror visited upon
the Rohingya stands out in relief against a relatively violence-free period in the region, and as a
2015 report issued by the Holocaust Museum indicated, there were many warning signs, including
the violation of accepted regional and international norms of human rights, suggesting that the
Rohingya would become targets of mass atrocities.13 The government of Myanmar has violated
established international and ASEAN human rights norms; the issue now concerns the political
will needed to enforce the norms.
Bellamy is careful to acknowledge that the acceptance of the R2P norm is but one of four
factors in the reduction of mass atrocities in Southeast Asia:
The dramatic and sustained decline of genocide and mass atrocities in East Asia was not
produced by any single factor, but by the combined effects of at least four important ones: a
reduction in the deliberate targeting of civilians in war, growing incomes across the region,
creeping democratization, and changing ideas about the nature of sovereignty and the
responsibilities for protection.14

Three of these factors, Bellamy observes, are structural; the fourth is cultural and symbolic, a result
of the incorporation of norms adapting the values of global human rights and R2P to those of East
Asia.15 These structural forces have played powerful roles in the reduction of mass atrocities and in
the creation of prevention mechanisms. Research has suggested as well that these structural factors
alone, without the appropriate cultural and ideational norms, do not and cannot lead to reduction
in mass atrocities.16 In the case of East Asia, it is clear that the establishment of human rights
norms and the values codified in R2P have played a role in the reduction of atrocities. As Pinker,
Bellamy, and others document, the structural factors that influence the outbreak or prevention of
mass atrocities are framed by ideas, norms, and discourse.17 The post-World War II human rights
revolution has, in Bellamy’s words, altered the thinking in East Asian countries
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about what constitutes legitimate conduct. These ideational shifts, which came in part from
global transformations, and in part from within the region, were transmitted by the region’s
growing middle class and activist civil societies and changed the expectations about the
proper relationship between governments and peoples.18

Scholars have corroborated Bellamy’s conclusions: Okere, Aning, and Nelson find that the
countries of ASEAN “have become increasingly involved in moving the [R2P] norm from rhetoric
to practice.”19 While there is a significant body of work that examines the three structural factors
that play significant roles in the decline of genocide and mass atrocity in East Asia, I seek here
to briefly explain how ASEAN’s genocide and mass atrocity prevention mechanisms intended
to foster changes in thinking and norms about human rights have contributed to the atrocity
prevention mechanisms and how they are evolving.
ASEAN was formed in 1967 to promote economic development and regional stability and
has contributed to the reduction in interstate war in the region.20 However, until the creation of
the R2P doctrine, ASEAN countries did not concern themselves with the mass atrocities that have
taken place within the borders of their member states until the advent of R2P. The Asia Pacific
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (APCR2P is “the most important norm entrepreneur and
advocate for R2P in Southeast Asia…”).21 The Centre “has led efforts to socialize the region on the
2005 version of R2P” and seeks to embed the three pillars of R2P, including extension of the human
rights imperative into the internal politics of ASEAN member countries. 22 Launched in February
2008 with the help of Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations Edward Luck and former
Foreign Minister of Canada Lloyd Axworthy, the aspiration of the Centre, observes Noel Morada,
one of the Centre’s directors, is to build “domestic constituencies around” the R2P norm with its
various programs.23
To build the R2P norm, the APCR2P uses a “bottom-up” approach through use of seminars and
workshops at the local level in the Asia-Pacific region on R2P and offers scholars the opportunity
to conduct policy-relevant, peer-reviewed academic research. The efforts of the Centre and the
more general and gradual acceptance in the region of the responsibilities of the state to protect its
citizens, and when it doesn’t, the responsibility of outside bodies to assist or to intervene to protect
human beings, irrespective of their geographical location, has borne some fruit in Southeast Asia.
The consensus of the emerging literature suggests that if global norms of human rights are to find
a place in ASEAN mass atrocity prevention mechanisms, they will need to be grafted onto those
that currently rule in the region; they cannot be imposed.24
The first mission of the APCR2P is to offer R2P norm-building training, projects, activities,
and workshops. Noel Morada, after conducting a series of interviews and workshops at different
locations in the Asia-Pacific region in 2005 to determine what might be done to promote R2P norms,
identified three best practices: translations of important UN and R2P materials into East Asian
languages, development and inclusion of R2P materials in the curriculum of East Asian universities,
and R2P workshops for government officials, military personnel, and important civilian groups.
The legacy of the Centre’s first R2P constituency-building workshop, hosted by the Centre in the
Philippines on June 25-26, 2009, is of importance. The workshop brought representatives from
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all of the important constituencies and focused on how the R2P norm could be promoted in the
Philippines. Morada reports that the workshop played an important role in providing information
on R2P to the Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs, which in turn influenced the Philippines’
taken on R2P during a meeting about the doctrine at the UN in July 2009.25
The second mission of the Centre is to promote research on R2P. The Centre has served as a
publishing house for works of research and as a scholarly clearinghouse for R2P in the Asia-Pacific
region. The APCR2P website hosts an “R2P Ideas in Brief” webpage. As a “resource hub,” the
webpage lists reports, podcasts, newsletters, and issue briefs outlining problems facing R2P. The
Centre has published full reports. A review of the “Ideas in Brief,” which lists five annual volumes
of research summaries of major issues, reveals well-researched and written case studies of R2P as
applied to human rights problems in the Asia-Pacific region.26 Individual scholars sponsored by
the Centre have made significant scholarly contributions to our understanding of genocide and
mass atrocity prevention mechanisms set forth by ASEAN. Two stand out as norm entrepreneurs:
Noel Morada and Alexander J. Bellamy. Both have provided comprehensive treatments of
efforts made by ASEAN member states to establish and develop the architecture for atrocity
prevention.
Morada, in his 2006 article “R2P Roadmap in Southeast Asia: Challenges and Prospects,”
outlined a future of R2P in the Asia-Pacific region.27 Written one year after the doctrine was
endorsed by the United Nations, Morada’s contribution is prescient, as he accurately predicted
both the obstacles to and the promise of implementing R2P in Southeast Asia. ASEAN member
states, with their principle of noninterference, have successfully avoided interstate war, but the
principle undercuts interference and interventions that might prevent mass atrocities committed
by ASEAN member states against its citizens.28 Morada has led efforts to embed the values of R2P
in the East Asian cultural context.
Bellamy is a prolific author, and he has emerged as an international authority on R2P. His
articles in Ethics and International Affairs, reviewing R2P at five years (2010) and at ten years (2015),
are major contributions to an understanding of R2P’s perils and potential. Articles published in 2008
(on conflict prevention and the responsibility to protect), 2009 (on R2P in the Asia-Pacific region),
three in 2011 (on R2P, the invasion of Libya, global politics, and international law), and his 2015 The
Responsibility to Protect: A Defense (Oxford University Press) contribute to an understanding of R2P
and the importance of norms and their creation, adaptation, and adoption.29 Morada and Bellamy
provide important leadership and support for ASEAN member states to implant the norms of
human rights and R2P as mass atrocity prevention mechanisms.
25
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Seaman writes that ASEAN “provides one of the most interesting case studies in relation to
R2P.”30 Although Morada notes that the doctrine “remains a difficult norm to promote and gain
acceptance in South-East Asia,” some progress is evident.31 R2P seems to be “making significant
inroads as a regional norm in the Asia-Pacific region”32 and has “great promise as a norm developer
for the principles of underpinning conflict prevention...”33 The literature suggests that at least four
norms, with varying levels of acceptance, are in use or development by ASEAN member states.
The ASEAN Way: The Norm of Collective Decision Making through Networked Civil
Societies in South East Asia
The formation of ASEAN in 1967 fostered diplomatic communication, promoted the creation of
shared values among the ten-member states, and helped create a regional civil society. As Morada
writes,
For almost 40 years, ASEAN has relied principally on norm-building and promotion to
manage inter-state conflicts... Much of the pressure [to create norms] emanates from an
increasingly networked civil society groups in Southeast Asia, which has undeniably become
a moral force to contend with especially on humanitarian issues and concerns. In short,
ASEAN states cannot just simply ignore the emergence of a regional civil society that now
serves as the main avenue for promoting more people-oriented norms in ASEAN.34

ASEAN, according to James Waller’s recent survey, “has demonstrated a constructive capacity
to partner with existing institutions, mechanisms, and relevant government actors of the 10
countries within their organization to promote genocide prevention.”35 After the end of the Cold
War, ASEAN countries sought to create shared norms between 1997 and 2007, which then led
community building between 2008 and 2015.36 To be sure, the progress toward shared norms has
not been without setbacks, as ASEAN’s collective decision making resists rapid implementation of
new values. Rather, over time, the networked ASEAN civil societies work out through compromise
and accommodation the tensions between global and local norms.37
Bellamy points to the numerous efforts made by his Centre and ASEAN member states to
promote atrocity prevention. There are a “number of regional initiatives” under way to strengthen
mass atrocity prevention norms, including the Asia Pacific Partnership for Atrocities Prevention.38
These initiatives build from the progress made to prevent mass atrocities in the region, doing
so by recognizing that individual nations will need to assimilate global human rights values
through dialogue and debate. ASEAN uses a consensus model of decision making, with all of
its drawbacks and strengths. While it takes time to secure a consensus, a process Bellamy rightly
calls “exasperating,” the shared judgments that produce norms are “sustainable and considered
legitimate.”39 The progress to establish norms against mass atrocity made through the networked
30
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33
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civil societies of ASEAN member states has been, in Bellamy’s judgment, “impressive.”40 As a
preventative mechanism, the collective decision making based on consensus is understood as the
“ASEAN Way.”41 ASEAN has, over time, assimilated some of the global human rights norms.
The Norms of Global Human Rights
Although Bellamy categorizes the decrease in the use of mass atrocities as a stratagem of war
as a structural factor, he also acknowledges that the “principal reasons why states have moved
away from employing mass atrocities as a tactic are both ideational and material in nature.”42
The creation of international norms prohibiting genocide and mass atrocity after World War II,
backed by the physical and moral force of the United Nations and the International Criminal Court
(ICC), found their way into the value structures of ASEAN member states. These actions include
an ongoing interrogation of norms that have been used to justify mass atrocity. Norms in the AsiaPacific region that were once viewed as “natural,” such as the right of a nation to attack another
or the right of a state to commit mass atrocities against its citizens, have been inverted. Since 2005,
countries in the Asia-Pacific region have gradually come to view human rights as a responsibility
of the sovereign state. Rather than framing relationship between global human rights and state
sovereignty as an antinomy, the R2P doctrine has prompted ASEAN member states to define the
protection of human rights as a responsibility of the state.
The R2P doctrine has encouraged sovereign states in the Asia-Pacific region to broaden the
range of their responsibilities to include the prevention of mass atrocities. As such, ASEAN member
states are attending to factors that spark atrocity crimes, including climate change, economic
disparities, food security, and others. Teitt identifies two efforts made by ASEAN member states
to broaden the focus of mass atrocity prevention.43 First, the Japanese are working to broaden
the definition of human security to include social and economic inequalities, health disparities,
hunger, and other problems. Second, ASEAN member states are seeking to implement policies
that confront poverty and economic inequality as mass atrocity prevention measures. The “narrow
but deep approach to implementing R2P,” Teitt writes, “which recognizes a broader development
assistance agenda is part of the global effort to end atrocities, resonates both with human security
concepts originating in the Asia Pacific and the structural capacity-building agenda advocated by
the states in the region.”44
The consensus of the scholarship on ASEAN human rights norms and mass atrocity
prevention mechanisms suggests that both are the result of slow and incremental modifications of
local norms through consensus-building decision-making procedures. International and regional
organizations, including ASEAN, are in constant dialogue through the offices of the United Nations
and institutions like APCR2P. The goal is to assimilate the universal values of human rights into
the norms of ASEAN countries. Indonesia and the Philippines, for example, endorsed both the
nonintervention policy favored by ASEAN member states and the third pillar of R2P that called
for intervention into the affairs of a sovereign state when that state had failed to protect the human
rights of its citizens. The “consensus decision-making and evolutionary institutional change” in
use by the United Nations “appears to have increased comfort among Asia Pacific states” with the
R2P implementation agenda.45 However, ASEAN member states have not fully worked through the
tension between the doctrine of nonintervention, which has decreased interstate mass atrocities,
and R2P in its call for humanitarian intervention by outside forces when a state has failed in its
responsibility to protect its citizens. A norm bridging the two is forming.

40
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An Evolving Norm Nesting the Principle of Noninterference and the Responsibility to Protect
within the Sovereign State
ASEAN’s founding documents (1967), the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration
of 1971, and the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and Article Two of the ASEAN Charter
(2007) commit ASEAN to the principle of noninterference by external parties in the sovereign
affairs of member states. The significant decline in the number of mass atrocities due to armed
conflict between states in the region since the end of the Cold War can be traced to this principle.46
Indeed, “scholars are relatively unanimous in agreeing that during the first decades of ASEAN,
the principle [of non-interference] managed to translate into reality.”47 As a result, “there has
been no interstate conflict involving casualties between two ASEAN members, despite the fact
that some ASEAN members have been traditional enemies since before joining the organization.
This is the case also in East Asia: inter-state war has almost disappeared after 1979, and especially
after 1987.”48 Paradoxically, the principle also protected and shielded states that committed mass
atrocities against its own citizens. ASEAN has resisted contesting human rights abuses conducted
by its member states against its citizens.49
The application of the principle of noninterference by ASEAN “has been extremely strict
and has presented one of the major obstacles for ASEAN human rights bodies to interpret their
mandates and their functions effectively since their inception.”50 ASEAN was faced with the choice
of either rejecting or accepting R2P’s principle that interference and intervention in the affairs of
an ASEAN member state is justified if the government is committing human rights abuses against
its citizens. Rather than framing the choice as a binary, ASEAN is attempting to bridge the two
through an act of creative accommodation and dissociation.51
ASEAN is on a trajectory that is slowly, with its ponderous, consensus-based decision
making, aligning and assimilating the principle of noninterference with the three pillars of R2P.52
The networked international and regional civil societies have insisted that the ASEAN principle
of noninterference “evolve in a way that reflects a degree of receptivity to principles associated
with R2P... Thus, many Southeast Asian states are moving away from the traditional notion of
sovereignty and towards accepting a localised variant of sovereignty as responsibility.”53 This act
of assimilation and dissociation is not simply a crude importation of global human rights norms
or a continuation of local practices with a symbolic nod to R2P. Rather, ASEAN has engaged in the
negotiation and creative adaptations producing new norms “that alters both the new norm (R2P)
and those more established norms (non-interference).”54
The ASEAN dissociation and creative reframing of the principle of non-interference and those
of R2P has broadened the definition of ASEAN state sovereignty to include the responsibility to
safeguard the human rights of its citizens. Bellamy and Drummond highlight two illustrations
of this new formulation in action: ASEAN’s response to Cyclone Nargis, which caused 138,000
causalities in Myanmar in 2008, and the positions taken by the region’s governments during the
2009 UN General Assembly debate on R2P. Both illustrations demonstrate how ASEAN honored
the principle of noninterference, while justifying intervention to secure the human rights of
individuals within member states as acts of assisting sovereign states to protect their citizens.
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Bellamy, in his 2016 survey concludes, “significant normative progress has been made in building a
regional consensus around the principle of the responsibility to protect.”55 In light of this progress,
ASEAN member states are now creating the norms necessary to prevent mass atrocity.
The Norm of Mass Atrocity Prevention
While atrocity crimes have decreased in Southeast Asia, there is a need to strengthen existing and
build new structures designed to prevent future outbreaks. The research suggests that mass atrocity
prevention is best done at the national level. Scholars and government officials are seeking to build
from the ASEAN’s successes in reducing the frequency of mass atrocities to develop an ASEANinflected R2P. Toward this end, a major effort is under way to fully mainstream R2P in Southeast
Asia. Government reports and scholars have offered recommendations that if implemented would
help create national architectures for ASEAN member states designed to prevent mass atrocities.56
Among the many recommendations, three are at the top of the agenda:
A. The need to continue promoting R2P and adapting it to the values and norms in the region.
To accomplish this end, R2P should be “properly contextualized in ASEAN’s language.”57
An effort should be made to suggest that ASEAN regional norms, values, and principles
are embedded in the Responsibility to Protect and are not alien to it.”58
B. A dedicated effort to strengthen and develop mass atrocity early warning systems.
Social science has identified the precursors to mass atrocity. ASEAN member states seek
to develop the tools needed to alert policymakers and the general public to conditions,
speech, and behavior that foretell mass atrocity. There is a need for networks that join
the ten ASEAN member states for the purpose of gathering and analyzing information
on human rights violations. At present, ASEAN countries need to devote resources to the
development of national architectures designed to prevent atrocity crimes.
C. The constructive management of diversity and deep pluralism. Atrocity crimes are often
the result of identity-based conflict. Government reports and scholarship highlight the
need for ASEAN countries to create cultural space and government institutions for people
of multiple and overlapping identities. Legal protections for minorities or those who do
not adhere to the majority’s religion or lifestyle are necessary to inoculate against atrocity
crimes. Conflict management systems, including conciliation, mediation, and arbitration,
should play major roles in atrocity prevention.
Conclusion
The member states of ASEAN have successfully reduced the number of wars and as a result, the
frequency of mass atrocities since the formation of the association in 1967. Scholars have identified
structural factors (reduction of mass atrocities as a weapon of war, rising incomes, and the spread
of democracy) and the norms framing them as explanations. The norms in play determine the
influence of the structural factors on the frequency of mass atrocities. The effectiveness of these
norms can be debated. Kassim argues, “R2P has only enjoyed lip service in Southeast Asia.”59
However, Kassim agrees with Bellamy and others that the doctrine is gaining acceptance as the
norm is debated and discussed by ASEAN member states.60 ASEAN member states have adopted
norms of collective decision making and global human rights and are integrating global human
rights into regional and national value systems. Although there are serious environmental and
political issues facing ASEAN, the association can draw from its history of success to develop new
norms that equip member states with the tools needed to prevent atrocity crimes. ASEAN stands as
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a model in its success at decreasing atrocity crimes, and the norms it has set forth and is developing
can offer lessons to other regional organizations. Future studies of successful norm creation should
include the roles played by the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and the Protection of the
Rights of Women and Children (ACWC), the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human
Rights (AICHR), the R2P focal points adopted by Australia, Cambodia, and Timor-Leste, and the
UN’s “Human Rights Up Front” initiative on the formation of ASEAN’s human rights norms.
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